This paper presents results from a 1971 natural experiment carried out by the Canadian government on the unemployment insurance system. At that time, the generosity of the UI system was increased dramatically. We find some evidence that the propensity to collect UI increases with a first-time exposure to the new UI system. Hence, as more individuals experience unemployment, their lifetime use of the system increases. This supply side hysteresis effect may explain why unemployment has steadily increased over the 1972-1992 period, even though the generosity of unemployment insurance did not.
Introduction
A recurrent theme in policy debates regarding social welfare programs is the relationship between benefits and the disincentives to work (Moffitt, 1982) . In the case of unemployment insurance, there is a great deal of evidence suggesting that it tends to increase both the duration of unemployment and the probability of *Corresponding author. 1 becoming unemployed. Moreover, work by Katz and Meyer (1990) , Corak (1993) and Meyer and Rosenbaum (1996) find evidence that workers adjust their labor supply so that unemployment insurance may subsidize part-year work. Despite this micro-econometric evidence, there does not seem to be a direct relationship between unemployment insurance benefits and the recent secular rise in unemploy-2 ment in the OECD . Lindbeck (1995) has pointed to social norms and the sluggish response of individual labor supply to changes in incentives as a potential source of 'supply side hysteresis' that may help explain this secular trend.
The goal of this paper is to build upon this idea, and see whether recent trends in the use of UI in Canada can be explained using a simple adaptive learning model. In a standard labor supply framework one supposes that changes in worker alternatives result in an immediate behavioral response. Moreover, whether or not the individual has had experience with the alternatives is irrelevant to his or her choice. However, there is a large body of evidence demonstrating that experience does matter for human decision making (e.g. Wickens, 1992) .
It is well recognized in the economics literature that it takes time for individuals to find an optimal response, and hence short-run supply elasticities are likely to be 3 smaller than long-run elasticities. The issue that we wish to address in the study is the importance of this lagged adjustment in the case of labor supply responses to changes in the unemployment insurance (UI) parameters. A number of studies have shown that individuals adjust their labor supply as a function of the parameters of the system in the predicted direction. However, in the case of the Canadian UI system, UI use and unemployment increased steadily from 1971 until the 1990s, though during this period benefit level were constant or falling (see Figs. 1 and 2).
The hypothesis we wish to explore is that workers did not immediately respond to the large increase in benefits that occurred in 1971. Rather, when workers experienced unemployment for the first time, due to natural turnover or a recession, this exposed them to UI and caused them to begin exploring ways to use the UI system as a subsidy to part-year work. This was possible due to a number of rule changes that occurred in 1971. First, coverage of the UI system was expanded from 68 to 96% of the work force. The number of weeks of work needed to qualify for benefits was reduced from 30 weeks in a 2-year period to 8 weeks in a single year. The maximum number of weeks during which benefits could be received by a worker having worked the minimum number of weeks required to qualify was increased from 15 to up to 44 weeks, depending on the regional unemployment rate (in high-unemployment regions benefits are more generous). The replacement rate was increased from 57% of previous earnings to 66% (or 75% if claimant had dependents). The generosity of the program is summarized by the subsidy rate (replacement rate 3 number of weeks of benefits for someone who has worked the minimum number of weeks to qualify / number of weeks needed to qualify) which is illustrated in Fig. 1 for the period 1951-1996. Given the shorter qualification period, the 1971 reform created an incentive for individuals to tailor their behavior to the parameters of the system, resulting in what many Canadians affectionately called the lotto 10 / 42. Work 10 weeks and win 42 weeks of paid holidays. The immediate impact of these changes are readily visible in Fig. 2 , which illustrates the evolution of the use and cost of the UI system. In 1972 there was a dramatic increase in both the number of UI recipients and the total cost of the program. However, both of these indexes continued to increase over the 1972-1992 period, with the fluctuations in outlay explained by the business cycle (for reference the unemployment rate is also illustrated in Fig.  2 ). The cost of the UI system as a fraction of total labor income increased from To see how conditioning may help explain this observation, consider a cohort of workers that were working full year in 1971, the date of the large-scale change to UI. Over time more and more workers from this cohort will have experienced unemployment and possibly received some UI. We find that the probability that an individual will receive UI increases when he or she has had experience with the system in the past, implying that the fraction of workers receiving UI should also 5 increase over time, even though the parameters of the system are unchanged. This also creates a hysteresis effect during recessions. A recession increases the number of workers who leave full-year employment and experience unemployment and UI. The conditioning or learning effect that we identify implies that at the end of the recession, the equilibrium number of workers who are unemployed should be greater, and hence the economy should not return to its pre-recession equilibrium level of employment. This may account for the rising trend in the unemployment rate illustrated in Fig. 2 . 4 The earnings replacement rate of UI was reduced to 60% in 1978 (from 66% in 1971) , 57% in 1990, and 55% in 1993 ; the minimum qualifying period was extended to 10 weeks in 1978 (from 8 weeks in 1971), and to 12 weeks in 1990.
5 Heckman and Borjas (1980) call this effect 'occurrence dependence'.
To ensure that we are identifying a behavioral change rather than a structural change in the economy, we follow the behavior of individual workers using a large administrative data set. In addition to the usual controls, we are able to control for individual effects, year effects and industry effects. Using a random effects probit model, we find some evidence that first-time treatment with the UI system permanently increases future use. In Section 2 we present a discussion of the model. Section 3 presents the administrative data set used in this study, while Section 4 provides some simple results using a difference-in-differences approach. Section 5 discusses the main estimation strategy. The results are discussed and summarized in Sections 6 and 7.
The effect of UI generosity on UI recipiency
For purposes of exposition it is useful to present a simple model that captures many of the incentive effects of UI. Suppose that at time t all workers are completely characterized by their base productivity denoted u , and their value of t home production denoted by u . The base productivity of a person is a composite t variable representing the market value of education, occupation choice and innate skills. Since this variable represents a market value, it will vary over time due to on-the-job training, technical change, etc.
In addition to a worker's base productivity, the wage of a worker is also affected by business cycle shocks, including seasonal shocks. Letting h denote the size of t this shock in period t, suppose that the wage of a worker is given by:
(1)
Abstracting away from the time required for search, individuals choose employment if and only if the wage is greater than the value of home production or w $ u . Let E h 5 u,u u u 1h $ u denote the set of worker characteristics that
would result in full-time employment in the absence of UI, while O h denotes the s d set of characteristics of workers who are out of the labor force. Now consider what happens when UI is introduced in the model. Suppose that once an individual has x weeks of insured employment, she or he is eligible for y weeks of benefits equal to a fraction a of the previous wage. An individual with characteristics (u,u) considers one of the following three options (with the t subscripts dropped for convenience):
1. Work full year at a wage of w 5 u 1h. 2. Exit the labor force to receive a benefit of u. 3. Work the number of periods necessary to qualify to UI and then collect the 6 benefits until exhaustion before beginning to work again. Letting d 5 x /(x 1 y) be the fraction of time the worker must be employed to earn y weeks of benefits, the return to the individual is given by ui 5 dw 1 (1 2 d )(u 1 aw) 5 (d 1 (1 2 d )a)w 1 (1 2 d )u. Let us call a worker that follows this strategy a part-year worker.
Individuals choosing to work part-year are from the set of characteristics:
Notice that the addition of a UI system creates an incentive for some full-time employees to work part-year, and for some individuals who are out of the labor market to work part-year. The implications of parameter changes are summarized in the following proposition. Proof. This result follows immediately from the observation that for d # d and
If workers receiving UI report that they are looking for work, then an increase in UI generosity (lower d or higher a) increases both measured unemployment and labor force participation. This observation is consistent with the finding of Card and Riddell (1993) that though unemployment grew in Canada during the 1980s, so did labor force participation, particularly by women. An actual example is employment in the arts. In Canada there a great deal of sectorial employment, such as summer theater companies, that permits the entry of businesses that survive because its employees are able to receive UI during the winter months. It is worth emphasizing that the supply side behavior described here must also be consistent with changes in demand side behavior. Firms, particularly those employing seasonal workers, are also learning and would increase their demand for seasonal workers in response to their increased supply. However, our panel does not have data on firms, and therefore we cannot identify the impact of UI changes on labor demand.
Hysteresis
When the major change to the UI system occurred in 1971, this increased the incentives for individuals to subsidize part-year employment with UI. Fig. 2 shows that the rate of use of UI increased sharply between 1971 and 1972. It then followed an upward trend between 1972 and 1992 even though the underlying incentives (subsidy rate) were constant or declining. The main goal of this paper is to investigate whether individuals permanently change their behavior after a bout of experience receiving UI.
While the immediate impact of the change in rules is consistent with the standard economic model of incentives, the fact that use of the system increased over time while benefits, if anything, decreased is not. The foundations for that model are based upon Savage's (1972) theory of decision making where it is assumed that each agent understands the consequences of each action. As both Knight (1921) and Simon (1956) have emphasized, individuals are not able in general to explore all possibilities before making a decision, but rather consider the consequence of actions that they perceive as salient for the current decision.
The two most important mechanisms for learning are experience and social learning. In the many laboratory studies of human behavior, we find that individuals adjust their behavior in the direction of increased rewards, but this response is not immediate. Rather individuals modify their behavior with repeated trials with a given situation. In the context of UI, this implies that the possibility of cycling in and out of the UI system is not salient for the decision making of individuals who work full time. However, individuals who lose their jobs, for whatever reason, would then apply for UI and become aware of the parameters of the system, and hence adjust their behavior appropriately.
In a recent study sponsored by Human Resources Canada, Bloom et al. (1997) find evidence that even in 1995, displaced workers who had been working full time for many years had less knowledge of the parameters of the UI system than 7 did repeat users. This study finds that a re-employment bonus had little impact for repeat UI users, while there was some evidence that displaced workers might alter their behavior as a consequence of this bonus. Together, these results suggest that even in 1995, there were significant differences in the knowledge and response rates of first-time UI users compared to repeat users.
In our study of workers from 1971 until 1992, we look for evidence of a hysteresis effect. That is, we explore the extent to which workers adapt their behavior as a consequence of experience with UI, and are then more likely to become repeat UI users. If experience with the system does indeed alter one's behavior, then after the initial increase in benefits, we should expect the equilibrium unemployment rate to increase over time as more people experience UI. The effect would be particularly evident during a recession, where we would expect the equilibrium level of unemployment to ratchet up after each downturn.
As Bandura (1986) has emphasized, social learning also has an important impact on behavior. In the context of UI, we would expect the impact of individual learning to be lower for those social groups that have high levels of UI recipiency. In those groups, individuals learn about UI from their friends and spouses, and hence are able to adapt their behavior given full knowledge of the alternatives. An implication is that if we can identify coherent social groups with significant UI recipiency, then the treatment effect from the first spell of unemployment for a member of such a group should be smaller. An implication for our data set is that the learning or treatment effect should be smaller is areas with high repeat use, such as the Maritime provinces, compared to low-unemployment provinces such as Ontario or Alberta.
Data and descriptive statistics
We analyze the dynamics of UI recipiency in Canada using a large longitudinal data set for the years 1972-1992. To create this data set, we combine the 'Status Vector File' of Employment Immigration Canada (EIC) from 1971 to 1993 with income tax data from the 'T4 Supplementary File' of EIC from 1972 to 1991.
These two data sets are complementary. The Status Vector File contains data pertaining to all UI claims established by each claimant whose Social Insurance Number (SIN) ends in the digit '5' (10% of the population). It also contains demographic information such as the age and sex of the claimant as well as the UI region in which the claim was filed. The drawback of this file is that it has very little information on what happens to claimants before and after their UI claims.
By contrast, the T4 Supplementary File provides no demographic information on workers, but it contains records of all sources of T4 income for workers whose 8 SIN ends in the digit '5'. It also provides information on the location and industry of the employer that issued the T4. This file can be used to identify whether a UI claimant received some labor income before and after each UI spell. By combining the two files, it is thus possible to reconstruct a detailed longitudinal history of UI and labor income recipiency from 1972 to 1991 for a large sample of workers. Note, however, that the sample only includes individuals who established at least 9 one UI claim between 1971 and 1993. This is a potential source of selection bias that we address in the empirical analysis.
We extract from the Status Vector File all claims that eventually led to the 8 The T4 tax form is the Canadian counterpart to the US W2 form. 9 A comparison between our administrative data set and the 1981 Canadian Census indicates that over 50% of the population established at least one claim between 1971 and 1993. This fraction is as high as 75% for some younger cohorts of males (those born in 1951). payment of regular UI benefits. We exclude workers filing claims for special benefits (sickness, maternity, etc.) from the analysis. We use the benefit period commencement of each claim to identify the year in which the UI spell started. Once we have identified all the years from 1972 to 1992 in which at least one spell started, we merge this information to the information contained in the T4 Supplementary File. From this file we know when a person first received T4 income. This enables us to identify a 'year of entry' in the sampling universe for each UI claimant. Table 1 indicates that for close to half of male UI claimants (slightly less for women), the year of entry is simply the year in which the T4 file starts, that is 1972. For most of these workers, the year of entry is really a year of entry in the sample as opposed to a year of entry in the work force. For the rest of the sample of claimants, what we call the 'year of entry' may either be a true year of entry in the work force or the year of 're-entry' for people who earned some T4 income before 1972 but no T4 income in 1972. Table 1 nevertheless indicates that the age of entry of half of the claimants (age at which T4 income is first recorded) is 20 or less. This suggests that most of the 50.7% of men and 48.6% of women whose year of entry is 1973 or later are not re-entrants in the work force.
Why is it so important to know when a claimant first 'entered the work force'? The answer is that if we want to find out how previous use of the system affects how long it takes before the person receives UI again, we need to know how long it took before the person used UI for the first time. Since different people join the work force at different times, we need to have some idea of when the person entered the workforce to compute the duration before the first UI spell. Our measure of entry is imperfect since some students earn T4 income during summer 10 jobs even if they have not made a 'permanent' transition to the work force. We nevertheless feel this is the best we can do with the available data. We discuss these issues again in Section 4.
We also use information from the T4 Supplementary File to compute a coarse measure of eligibility to UI. We classify as 'eligible for UI in year t' individuals who have received some labor income in year t or t 2 1, since people who have not worked at any time during year t and year t 2 1 can never qualify for a new UI benefit period starting in year t. This UI eligibility variable can be used to correct for potential estimation biases likely to arise when people exit the workforce temporarily or permanently because of early retirement, illness, etc.
10 Another data problem is that many individuals may have received some UI before the reform of 1971. Since we do not have any information on these pre-1971 UI spells, we have to assume that workers have never received UI before 1971. To the extent that workers who have collected UI before 1971 have a good knowledge of UI benefits, we may be understating the learning effect by treating the first post-1971 UI spell as the first-ever experienced spell of UI. One could also argue that the 1971 reform was so profound that experience with the pre-1971 system had little informational value after 1971. Once the year of entry has been identified in the T4 File, this information is merged to the information about demographic characteristics and UI spells from the Status Vector File. The two files are combined into a yearly panel data file. There is one observation per person in the panel for each year (from the year of entry to 1992). Note that we do not keep an observation in the sample when the person is under 15 or over 65 years old. We also exclude people born before 1912 or after 1972. The resulting sample contains 10 253 535 observations for 618 911 men who have started a UI spell at least once in the years 1972-1992. The comparable sample of women contains 8 074 326 observations for 494 697 women.
A few statistics on the composition of the samples are reported in Table 2 . The average age in the sample is slightly under 35. The regional composition of the sample more or less reflects the relative weight of each province in the national population. Note however, that Quebec and especially the Maritimes are overrepresented since a larger fraction of the work force has received UI at least once in these provinces than in provinces west of Quebec.
The table also shows that men in the sample received at least some T4 income in four years out of five and started a UI spell in one year out of five. These proportions are slightly smaller for women. The probability of starting a UI spell is disaggregated by provinces and by year in the second column of Table 2 . Once again, there are important East-West differences as people in Quebec and the Maritimes are more likely to start a UI spell than people in other provinces. Not surprisingly, the probability of starting a spell of UI is also counter-cyclical.
Difference-in-differences estimates
The descriptive statistics reported in Table 2 do not exploit the longitudinal aspect of the data, nor do they give any indication on how, for example, the past history of UI recipiency is related with the current probability of starting a UI spell. In what follows, we present some descriptive statistics that highlight the dynamic aspects of UI recipiency.
One advantage of working with a large data set like ours is that it is easy to control for observed characteristics by dividing the sample in homogeneous groups of people and doing the analysis separately for each group. In what follows we select three cohort of men and three cohorts of women men born in 1931, 1941 and 1951, respectively. The three particular birth years are selected so that people are old enough to be in the workforce in 1972 and young enough to be in the 11 workforce in 1992.
If learning effects are important, a given experience with the UI system should have a larger impact on the future probability of receiving UI for people who have no previous experience with the UI system than for people who have some previous experience. One simple measure of the magnitude of learning effects is obtained by comparing the evolution in the probability of UI recipiency of one group of workers that has no previous UI experience with an otherwise comparable group of workers that has some previous experience.
More concretely, consider a fixed cohort of workers at the beginning of the 1981-1983 recession. Some of these workers have received UI in the past while some others have not. Focusing on the 1981-1983 period is an interesting 'natural experiment' since it 'exposed' many workers to unemployment and UI recipiency for the first time in their life. If learning is important, the post-recession (e.g. 1984-1986) probability of receiving UI should be higher than the probability that would have prevailed if they had never been exposed to UI. Although this hypothetical probability cannot be directly observed, a control group of workers that were exposed to UI before the recession can be used to calculate the change in the probability of receiving UI between the recession (1981) (1982) (1983) ) and the post-recession period (1984) (1985) (1986) ) that would have prevailed in the absence of learning effects. Since these workers have already been exposed to the system, a new exposure during the recession should not have any additional effect on the future probability of receiving UI. The change in probability for workers that have been exposed before is thus net of learning effects.
This suggests a simple difference-in-differences estimator of the effect of learning on the probability of using UI. Panel A of Table 3 reports separate difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of learning for the cohorts of men and women born in 1931, 1941 and 1951 . Columns 1-3 indicate the probability of receiving UI at least once during the periods 1981-1983, 1984-1986 and 1987-1989, respectively . These probabilities are simple empirical frequencies for all individuals of the relevant cohorts in the administrative data. While this probability decreases sharply in the post-recession years for workers who had been exposed to UI before the 1981-1983 recession (rows 1b, 2b and 3b), it remains relatively stable, at least for the 1984-1986 period, for workers who had never received UI before the recession. Relatively speaking, a first exposure to UI during the recession increases the probability of receiving UI in the future. These results suggest that part of the upward trend in the use of UI is due to the fact that exposure to the system permanently increases the probability of future use.
One potential problem with this exercise is that all individuals in our administrative data set have received UI at least once between 1972 and 1992. By definition, individuals who had not experienced UI before 1981 have to do so between 1981 and 1992. Otherwise, they would not be included in the sample. One way to think about this problem is that we are missing observations for individuals who never collect UI. This problem is easily fixed since the size of this 'residual' category is the difference between the total size of the corresponding population and the number of individuals included in the administrative data. For instance, the previous experience by incorporating the information from the Census in the calculations. These 'corrected probabilities' are reported in Panel B of Table 3 . The corresponding difference-in-differences estimates suggest that a first exposure to UI permanently increases the probability of future use in a 3-year period by 7-11 percentage points.
Estimation by random effect probit
In order to look more formally at the dynamics of UI recipiency, consider the following model for the probability that individual i starts a spell of UI in period t:
where i 5 1, . . . ,N, t 5 1, . . . ,T, F(.) is a cumulative distribution function. In this paper, we simply assume that F(.) is a unit normal. The cumulative distribution function F(.) is increasing in its arguments. An increase in arguments such as a or i 9
x b will thus increase the probability that individual i starts a spell of UI in period One difficulty in isolating the importance of learning effects is that many other factors may explain why the history of UI recipiency of a given person i, (U , . . . ,U ), may help predict whether the person will receive UI in period t.
To see this, note that except for the learning term
standard statistical model for a binary variable with panel data (see Heckman, 1978; Chamberlain, 1980; Heckman, 1981b) . In such models, there are two reasons why the history of UI recipiency of a given person i, (U , . . . ,U ), may
help predict whether the person will receive UI in period t. First, certain individuals may be more likely to be unemployed and to receive UI because they are less-skilled and / or they have a high marginal valuation of leisure. These factors are summarized by the random person effect a . Since this random effect is i by definition fixed for a given person i over time, it increases the probability that the person will receive UI in any time period. As a result, previous use of UI will be strongly correlated with present use of UI since some people are always likely to receive UI (high a ), while some others are not (low a ). This could give the i i misleading impression that previous use of UI is a cause of the present use of UI. This is called the problem of unobserved heterogeneity. The history of UI recipiency of a given person i may also help predict whether the person will receive UI in period t because of the presence of the lagged dependent variable U in Eq. (3). Note that in the estimation we consider it21 models that include further lags of U . We call this particular form of state it dependence an adjustment lag. It is natural to expect an adjustment lag in the data for a variety of reasons. For instance, it is well known that the rate of job separation is higher in the first year on a job than in subsequent years (see Farber, 1994) . In other words, a job separation is more likely to occur at time t if there was also a separation at time t 2 1 than otherwise. Since UI recipiency is positively correlated with job separations, a UI spell is more likely to be observed in year t if U 5 1 than if U 5 0. Alternatively, workers who have lost some
specific human capital because of permanent job displacement may be more likely to be unemployed than if they still had that specific human capital. A UI spell due to permanent job displacement may thus increase the future probability of receiving UI. The key difference between an adjustment lag and learning is that the adjustment lag only temporarily affects the probability of receiving UI, while 13 learning effects are permanent. Clearly, the fact that the history of UI recipiency (U , . . . ,U ) may help
predict whether the person will receive UI in period t is not a proof of the existence of learning effects. The econometric challenge consists of isolating learning effects from the presence of unobserved heterogeneity and adjustment lags. We discuss the econometric strategy in detail below. One final remark is that the variable L is only a crude measure of learning.
it People may also learn how to use the UI system through friends and family. This yields the interesting prediction that the relative role of past UI experience in learning how to use the system should be less important in regions and / or industries in which the use of UI is widespread. One testable implication of this learning model is that the learning coefficient should be lower in high-UI regions such as the Maritimes or Quebec than in low-UI regions such as Ontario or Alberta. We may also be understating the importance of learning by focusing on learning by individuals only. Since UI is not experience rated in Canada, firms have an incentive to learn along with the worker what is the best way to use the UI system to subsidize part-year work. If this effect is occurring across all firms over time, then the year effects we include in all specifications will absorb learning effects by firms and understate the importance of learning in the whole labor market.
Estimation methods
Under the assumption that F(.) is a unit normal, the probability that individual i will start a spell of UI in period t can be rewritten as:
where:
The probability of observing a sequence (U , . . . ,U ) of UI spells is thus equal i 1 iT to:
i t i t i t i t t51
This probability is the essential building block of the likelihood function to be maximized. There are two important issues, however, that need to be addressed before the model can be estimated. First, the probability in Eq. (6) is conditional on a particular value of the random effect a . Since the random effect is not i observed, we need to integrate over its distribution to obtain an unconditional probability of observing the sequence (U , . . . ,U ):
where G(.) is the cumulative distribution function of the random effect a . The log-likelihood function of the model is then obtained by summing up the log of (7) over all the observations:
Since we have already assumed that the cumulative distribution function F(.) is normal, it seems natural to follow authors like Heckman (1981a) and assume that G(.) is also normal. In general, evaluating the log-likelihood function (8) requires some numerical integration, which is computationally burdensome in a large panel data set like the one used here. We thus follow the initial suggestion of Lerman and Manski (1981) 
We will refer to the estimates obtained by maximizing Eq. (9) as SML 15 estimates. We use K520 in the empirical analysis presented below. The second important estimation issue arises because of the nature of the administrative files that we use to construct the data set. Since the Status Vector File only contains information on workers who file a UI claim at least once, we have no demographic information on workers who never filed a claim. We thus have to correct for the potential sample selection bias that could result from the way the final sample is constructed.
We correct for sample selection by including some people who never received 16 UI in the sample. Although this cannot be done directly because of the limitations of the administrative data files, some external data sources can be used 14 See also Gourieroux and Monfort (1993) for a recent survey of simulation-based estimation methods.
15 Although SML estimates are only consistent when the number of draws K goes to infinity (Lerman and Manski, 1981; Gourieroux and Monfort, 1993) , we noticed in several empirical experiments that there were only small differences between the estimates obtained with 5, 10, 20 or 100 random draws (results from these experiments are available on request).We are thus conservative in using a K as large as 20. 16 An alternative approach is to incorporate explicitly the probability of receiving UI at least once in the log-likelihood function and maximize the resulting conditional log-likelihood function. We used this approach in a previous version of this paper and found results that are very similar to those reported here.
to estimate the fraction of people who never received UI. We compute the fraction of individuals who never received UI by combining information from the administrative data with population counts by detailed age groups from the 1981 17 Canadian Census. We then use these estimated fractions to generate a random sample of non-UI recipients who look exactly like UI recipients except that we set their U 's to zero in all periods. We then maximize the log-likelihood function Eq. it (9) over a sample composed of the subsample of UI recipients who earned some wage income in 1980 and the 'artificial' subsample of non-UI recipients who also earned some wage income in 1980.
A further advantage of the SML method is that it is straightforward to incorporate heterogeneity in other parameters than the intercept a. It seems natural to introduce heterogeneity in the learning parameter u since a first experience with 0 UI may have different effects on different workers. To introduce heterogeneity in the learning parameter, let:
where v is a standard normal variable and s is the standard deviation of u . The
log-likelihood function can now be approximated by randomly drawing K values
Note that u and v will be positively correlated if the learning effect and the i i probability of a first experience with UI are both larger for some workers than others. We allow for a possible correlation between heterogeneity in the learning 18 effect and the intercept in the estimation. Though our model is a random effect model, it is important to point out that it explicitly takes into account the correlation between the person effect a and the i explanatory variables related to previous use of UI (U and L ) since we are it21 it jointly modeling the probability of receiving UI in all sample years.
Results
Given the numerical burden associated with maximizing the log-likelihood function, we only perform the estimation over a randomly selected subsample. In order to obtain estimates precise enough for several demographic groups in each province, we randomly select a 1-in-5 sample for Newfoundland, Nova Scotia, New Brunswick, and Saskatchewan, a 1-in-6 sample for Manitoba, a 1-in-8 sample for Alberta, a 1-in-20 sample for British Columbia, and a 1-in-50 sample for Quebec and Ontario. Prince Edward Island, Yukon and Northwest Territories are excluded from the estimation since these regions cannot be identified separately in the public use release of the 1981 Census micro data.
For both men and women in each province, we further divide the sample in three subsamples based on their year of birth. The first demographic subsample includes individuals born before 1946 who were all old enough to be in the labor force in 1972. The second sample is a sample of 'baby-boomers' born from 1946 to 1955, while the third sample of individuals born after 1955 were unlikely to have entered the workforce in 1972. We also limit our analysis to observations that satisfy the 'eligibility' rule of having received some T4 income during the current or the previous year. We have also estimated our models without this selection rule and found very similar results.
We first estimate separate models for each of the six demographic groups (two genders and three cohorts) in each province. In each of the 54 random effect probit models, we include the learning variable, the first four lags of the dependent variable (U to U ), age and age squared, and a full set of year and industry it21 it24
dummies. We decided to include four lags of the dependent variable after observing that the estimated effect of further lags was rarely statistically different from zero. The industry dummies are included to ensure that what we call a learning effect is not simply the result of a loss in human capital due to job 19 displacement from an industry to another. Including industry dummies may, however, understate the importance of learning if workers who have just learned about the benefits of the UI program move to an industry where it is easier to work part-year. Table 4 reports estimates from models in which unobserved heterogeneity is only included in the intercept. Unobserved heterogeneity is introduced in both the intercept and the learning coefficient in Table 5 . We do not include any interactions between the learning variable and other variables in these simple models. The parameter u is thus implicitly set to zero.
1
The estimates of the learning parameter u reported in Table 4 are on average 0 positive, but some interesting patterns seem to emerge. First, learning effects tend to be large and positive for men born before 1946 but much smaller and often 19 If a first experience with UI was simply a proxy for a loss of human capital due to job displacement, then controlling for industry should reduce the estimated effect of the first experience with UI. Since we found that excluding the industry dummies had no systematic effect on the estimated models (relative to the models reported in Tables 4 and 5), this suggests that what we call a learning effect is not simply a proxy for the loss of human capital. a Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All models also include a full set of year effects, four lagged values of the dependent variable, age and its squared, and nine industry dummies. Unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for by including a standard normal component in the intercept and estimating the model using simulated maximum likelihood (20 draws). 20 negative for women and younger men. In addition, learning effects are largest in Ontario, Saskatchewan, Alberta and British Columbia, four provinces in which the use of UI is less pervasive than in the rest of the country.
These two patterns of results are consistent with the role of social vs. individual learning mentioned earlier in the text. The more widespread the use of UI is in a region at a point of time, the less previous experience with UI will affect the propensity to use UI. When 'everybody else' uses the system, a first experience with the system will not teach a person anything he or she did not already know through family or friends. The results reported in Table 4 thus support the view that younger cohorts of men and women living in areas where the use of UI is 20 Interestingly, there was a substantial decline in the employment rate of older men in Canada relative to the United States during the 1970s and 1980s. From the mid-1970s to the late 1980s, the employment rate of men aged 55-64 declined by 7 percentage points in the United States but by 12 percentage points in Canada. This difference is consistent with learning effects being larger for older men than for other groups in the workforce. a Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. All models also include a full set of year effects, four lagged values of the dependent variable, age and its squared, and nine industry dummies. Unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for by including a standard normal component in the intercept and the learning coefficient and estimating the model using simulated maximum likelihood (20 draws). more widespread already knew how the system worked before receiving UI for the first time. It is hard to see how other theories of occurrence dependence such as models of 'addiction' or other sources of 'vicious circles' could explain the pattern of results reported in Table 4 . For example, if people get addicted to UI in the way they get addicted to cigarette smoking, there is no reason why the effect of first-time use of UI would vary across cohorts and regions. By contrast, the substitutability between individual and social learning provides a simple rationalization for the patterns observed in the data. Table 4 . The most striking fact is that the youngest cohort enters in the labor market at a much higher rate of UI use than older cohorts. This is consistent with the view that these workers knew about the generosity of the program (through social learning) before they experienced UI for the first time. A second noticeable fact is that the rate of UI use did ratchet up after the 1981-1983 recession for the oldest cohort. It did not ratchet up, however, for the youngest cohort which eventually went back to the pre-recession rate of UI use. This suggests that for individuals in the oldest cohort, a first exposure to UI (through the 1981-1983 recession) had a larger effect on future UI use than for younger cohorts. The evolution of the aggregate UI use rates is, therefore, consistent with the individual vs. social learning interpretation of the results of Table 4 . A more sophisticated interpretation of social learning could also explain why some of the estimated effects in Table 4 are actually negative. If the information gathered through social learning is a bit outdated, it is possible that younger workers who entered the market after the 1971 reform learned socially about the benefits when these were very generous in the 1970s, but then experienced UI for the first time in the 1980s. At that point, they found out that UI was in fact less generous than they first thought which reduced their future propensity to use UI. One testable implication of this hypothesis that we will discuss below is that the learning coefficient should be larger in the 1970s (when people learn UI is more generous than expected) than in the 1980s (when people learn the benefits are no longer as generous as in the 1970s).
The average learning effect becomes larger when unobserved heterogeneity is also introduced in the learning effect in Table 5 . For all practical purpose, the estimated learning effect is positive for each individual demographic group in Ontario and in Western Canada. The results reported in Table 5 thus reinforce our previous conclusion about the importance of learning.
We also estimate a pooled version of the model in which we combine the data from the nine provinces for each of the six demographic groups. One advantage of working with a pooled sample is that we can exploit the variation of the parameters of the UI system over regions and time to estimate the effect of these parameters on the propensity to use UI. We combine these UI parameters into a single subsidy rate (see Fig. 1 ). An increase in the subsidy rate tends to increase the fraction of workers who work part-year and regularly collect UI (Section 2). It should thus have a positive effect on the probability of receiving UI. One interesting hypothesis we can also test in this setting is whether the subsidy rate has a larger effect on people who had some previous experience with the UI system than on people who never had such experience. In terms of Eq. (3), this means that the component of the vector of parameters u corresponding to the 1 subsidy rate (one of the elements of x ) should be positive. To ensure that the it estimated value of this parameter does not simply reflect omitted trends or regional differences in the size of the learning effect, we include (but do not report in the tables) a full set of year and province dummies and interact the learning variable with these dummies.
The random effect probit estimates of the pooled models for men are reported in Table 6 . The results for women are reported in Table 7 . In both cases, we estimate models with unobserved heterogeneity in both the intercept and the learning coefficient. Given the large number of parameters in the estimated models, we only discuss few broad patterns in the results. Two main conclusions emerge from these tables:
1. The subsidy rate always has a positive and significant effect on the probability of receiving UI. These effects are quite small, however, in economic terms. According to the parameter estimates, the impact of a 100% increase in the subsidy rate on the probability of receiving UI is 2-3 percentage points for most of the estimated specifications. The effect of the subsidy rate does not tend to be systematically larger, however, for individuals who have been exposed to UI in the past than for individuals who have not been exposed. 2. The interactions between learning and year effects (not shown in the tables)
show no systematic pattern in the learning effect over time. This is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the learning effect was larger in the 1970s, when workers experiencing UI for the first time found out that the system was more generous than they thought, than in the 1980s when the system was no longer quite as generous. By contrast, the learning effect still tends to be larger for older than for younger cohorts.
Taken together, the results reported in Tables 4-7 provide some (mixed) evidence that one's first experience with UI has a permanent effect on the future probability of receiving UI. While the learning effect is strongly positive for older cohorts of men, it is often negative for other groups. This pattern of results is a Note: The subsidy rate is the UI replacement rate multiplied by the maximum number of weeks of eligibility and divided by the minimum number of weeks to qualify. Unobserved heterogeneity in the intercept and the learning coefficient is modeled as a bivariate standard normal distribution. The model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood (20 draws). A full set of year and province dummies interacted with the learning variable, as well as nine industry dummies are included in all models.
partly consistent with the idea that individual or social learning about the parameters of the UI system has an impact on employment and unemployment behavior. It could also be consistent, however, with other sources of 'hysteresis' coming from the supply side of the market.
Note, finally, that these results are robust to the choice of estimation procedure. For example, we obtained similar results using a linear probability model with a Note: The subsidy rate is the UI replacement rate multiplied by the maximum number of weeks of eligibity and divided by the minimum number of weeks to qualify. Unobserved heterogeneity in the intercept and the learning coefficient is modeled as a bivariate standard normal distribution. The model is estimated by simulated maximum likelihood (20 draws). A full set of year and province dummies interacted with the learning variable, as well as nine industry dummies are included in all models. 22 fixed effects. Interestingly, McCall (1999) obtained similar results for the United States using a linear probability model with fixed effects. This suggests that our results do not simply reflect some spurious features of the Canadian labor market.
Summary of the findings: how big are the learning effects?
Both the difference-in-differences approach and the random effect probit model suggest that learning plays a role in the probability of receiving UI. We first present some simple 'back-of-the-envelope' calculations that suggest that learning effects may be large enough to explain a substantial fraction of the 2-2.5 percentage point gap in unemployment rates between Canada and the United States that emerged in the early 1980s.
To see this, first notice that both the difference-in-differences and the random effect probit estimates indicate that a first exposure to UI increases, on average, the future probability of receiving UI by 3-4 percentage points a year. This is easily seen for the difference-in-differences models for which a first exposure increases the probability of future use by around 10 percentage points over a 3-year period 23 (Table 3 ), or at least 3-4 percentage points a year.
In the case of the random effect probit model, the effect of learning on the probability of receiving UI depends on workers' type (unobserved heterogeneity) as well as on the size of the learning parameter. Consider a learning parameter of 0.2 (average of the parameters in Table 5 ) and a variance of unobserved heterogeneity of 0.27 (average estimated value). In this case, the effect of learning on the future probability of receiving UI varies from 5 percentage points for less-skilled workers (5th percentile of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity) to 1% for highly-skilled workers (95th percentile of the distribution of unobserved heterogeneity). The average effect is around 3 percentage points, 24 which is comparable to the difference-in-differences estimates.
Since over 50% of individuals in the sample period eventually receive UI at least once, learning effects can potentially explain a 1.5-2 percentage points 25 increase in the probability of receiving UI. . If there was a one-to-one mapping between UI and unemployment, as Fig. 2 suggests, this would mean that learning effects account for a substantial fraction of Canada-US unemployment rate gap 26 that emerged in the 1980s. 23 Since many workers receive UI more than once over a 3-year period, the yearly probability exceeds a third of the probability over a 3-year period.
24 Using a variance of unobserved heterogeneity smaller than 0.27 yields the same average effect of learning. It simply reduces the effect for less-skilled workers and increases the effect for highly-skilled workers, leaving the average effect virtually unchanged. 25 The 50% figure is obtained by comparing the number of people in the sample to total population counts in the 1981 Canadian Census. 26 There is a small slippage in these calculations since the yearly probability of starting a spell of UI (the variable we analyze) is not the same as the weekly probability of collecting UI which corresponds more closely to the unemployment rate. This means that our estimate of 1.5-2 percentage points is biased up since one is more likely to collect UI during a year than during a given week. On the other hand, learning may also increase the duration of UI spells, which would bias the results in the other direction. A further bias is the fact that our crude measure of learning may well underestimate the full learning effects because of social learning, etc. In Fig. 4 , we present a more detailed simulation of the impact of learning on the 27 rate of UI use for men. This simulation consists of setting the learning coefficient (main effect plus interactions) to zero in the model presented in Table 6 , and then simulating the UI usage rate that would prevail in the absence of learning effects. The impact of learning on the UI usage rate is the difference between the actual UI usage rate and the simulated UI usage rate. The figure shows that until the recession of 1981-1983, which was the worst recession in Canada since the Great Depression, learning had little impact on the UI usage rate. The impact of learning was to ratchet up the UI usage in the years following the recession. This is consistent with the view that a first exposure to UI during the recession had a permanent effect on the future propensity to collect UI.
The results reported in Fig. 4 suggest that learning is a source of supply side hysteresis in the usage rate of UI. That is, a negative labor market shock like the recession of 1981-1983 can have a permanent effect on the usage rate of UI as many workers learn for the first time about the benefits of UI through this bout of unemployment. To the extent that UI recipiency is closely connected with being unemployed, our results also suggest that learning about UI may also be a source of hysteresis in the unemployment rate.
Concluding remarks
We find some mixed evidence that first-time use of the unemployment insurance system in Canada increases the probability of future use. As workers are exposed to UI for the first time for a variety of reasons, they learn about the functioning of the system and adjust their behavior accordingly.
This behavior is consistent with individuals responding to the incentives provided by the system. The fact that experience is required for a change in behavior is consistent with laboratory studies of learning. It also suggests that studies based on cross-section estimates of supply responses underestimate the long-term impact of the disincentive effects of social welfare programs.
In Canada's case, the increased divergence of the Canadian and American unemployment rates has long been a source of concern. The study of Card and Riddell (1993) is unable to identify the source of the difference based upon a standard supply and demand analysis. The lagged adjustment effects identified in this study may provide a coherent explanation for this effect. Given the size of the 1971 changes to the UI system, even as benefits decreased in the subsequent 20 years, workers unfamiliar with the system may still modify their behavior after a spell of unemployment several years after the change because they had never considered part-year work as an option. The results reported in Fig. 4 are consistent with this explanation.
If subsequent research supports this conjecture, this has potentially important implications for the design of social welfare programs. Specifically it would imply that the feedback between a policy change, and its ultimate impact on the economy may be very slow, and hence it suggests that it may be very costly to learn about and correct policy errors. Moreover, once individuals have adjusted their behavior to the system, one is likely to face a similar lagged adjustment in the reverse direction as individuals take time to learn and respond to the new parameters. Canada has recently tightened significantly its UI rules. It will be interesting to see how the Canada-US unemployment rate gap responds as a consequence.
Secondly, this highlights the importance of coverage in determining the impact of changes in a program. Rule changes that affect current recipients can be expected to have an immediate impact because the individuals experience the rule change. However, for program rule changes that involve an increase in the target population, our results suggest that it may take some time before the new 28 individuals at risk respond fully to the new incentives. In summary these results suggest that great care must be taken if we are to properly interpret the relationship 28 Another example of this effect occurs for the foodstamp program in the US where various estimates find that between 40% and 65% of eligible households do not participate in the program. One important reason for this is that individuals did not know they were eligible. See Currie (1995) , pp. 89-90, for a discussion of the literature. See also the recent work by Yelowitz (1997). between changes in incentives at the individual level, and the subsequent impact on the economy as a whole.
